Space & Astronomy/Space and Astronomy (October 1993).iso/pc/text/spacedig/v16_0/v16no015.txt

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Date: Thu,  7 Jan 93 05:12:02
From: Space Digest maintainer <[e-mail]>
Reply-To: [e-mail]
Subject: Space Digest V16 #015
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Space Digest                Thu,  7 Jan 93       Volume 16 : Issue 015

Today's Topics:
                Fabrication (was fast track failures)
      Let's be more specific (was: Stupid Shut Cost arguements)
                            Marketing SSTO
                          Moon Dust For Sale
                      Space Questions and more..

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Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 06:05:59 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: Fabrication (was fast track failures)
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Edward V. Wright) writes:
>In <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>>Having design engineers apprentice on
>>the shop floor for a few years *before* they get to design a product
>>would do a world of good for our manufacturing sector. It certainly
>>has for the Japanese and old school Germans.
>
>You mean like that horrid know-nothing, Wernher von Braun? ;-)

I have absolutely no idea where you get such absurd ideas. Von Braun
is the perfect example of a wartime technologist. He took enormous
risks and spent cubic money to bring a critical system in on schedule.
That's admirable in wartime, but not in the commercial arena. You'll
notice that after Saturn achieved it's Cold War objective of oneupmanship
against the USSR, it was promptly dropped because no other missions
could justify it's expense and there was never a hope of recouping it's
development costs.

Shuttle was the "low cost" system that was touted to replace expensive
expendibles like Saturn. When Shuttle proved not to be so low cost after
all, it was too late to go back to the already dead Saturn, and Congress
refused to fund development of a launcher to replace Shuttle. So now we
have a capable, but expensive, launcher in operation. We should never again
make the mistake of killing our only operational system in favor of a paper
spacecraft that hasn't established a solid track record of meeting it's
performance and cost goals. Thus I champion continuing to fly Shuttle
until there are proven systems on line to replace it. Neither the paper
DC-1 nor the proposed Soyuz on Titan have that track record yet. They
may never have that track record and some completely different system
may be needed to replace the capabilities of Shuttle. Meanwhile Shuttle
continues to maintain a presence in space for the USA that does worthwhile
missions.

Unlike Allen, I am completely convinced that killing Shuttle now will
not cause any money to be reprogrammed to his pet schemes. The only
results of killing Shuttle would be 7,000 Florida aerospace workers on
the unemployment line, workers in Houston, California, Nevada, Mississippi,
Alabama, and other places on the unemployment line, all hope of recouping
Shuttle development and infrastructure costs gone forever, a long hiatus in
US manned spaceflight if not it's permanent termination, and more money for
the VA and Clinton's national health care program. I find that scenario
personally unacceptable.

Gary
--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV          |    You make it,     | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems |    we break it.     | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way             |    Guaranteed!      | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244     |                     | emory!ke4zv![e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 07:28:39 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: Let's be more specific (was: Stupid Shut Cost arguements)
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Pat) writes:
>Gary,
>
>    The operating methods of any stackable vehicle are going to
>    significantly different from a recoverable single stage vehicle.

And the operating methods of any reusable vehicle are going to be different
from any expendible. The only reusable spacecraft we have experience with
isn't cheaper per pound to fly than some expendibles, just ask Allen. DC
is *supposed* to be much better, but then so was Shuttle at the same point
in it's development.

>    You keep arguing that the russians have high costs for their
>    stackables, and that ariane has high costs subsidized by the government.

The Russians do have higher costs than the ones they are quoting during
the current fire sale. As their economy converts from communism, those
costs will begin to show in their export products. I'm not saying their
costs are higher than ours, but they could be, it depends on how salaries
go in the new economy. Arianne's development costs were subsidized by the
ESA governments, mainly France in it's nationalized aerospace industry,
and operational pricing is in large part political. That's not to say that
their real costs are higher than ours, but they may be. Long March is in
the same situation, but worse, because the economy producing it is still
shifting costs in hidden ways. The *Chinese* probably don't even know the
true cost of the vehicle, and they certainly aren't telling anyone else.
They're willing to operate at a loss just to get foreign exchange.

>    I know you believe that cheap stackables can be done,  but those
>    are the same paper designs you condemn DC for.

I don't condemn DC for being a paper design. All new vehicles are paper
designs at some point. What I do condemn is the idea of giving up an
operational system in the *hope* that the paper vehicle will meet it's
promise on schedule and on budget. That would be like telling Delta to
quit flying all it's current aircraft today and laying off all it's
personnel today because there's going to be a cheaper aircraft available
in 5 or 10 years. Once you dismantle an enterprise, it's extremely
difficult to ever bring it back to life.

>    Shuttle could have lower costs then  NASA currently has,
>    but it still needs a tremendous infrastructure.  The OPF,
>    the VAB, Tilting bay,  the crawler/transporter.  Launch towers.

Of course Shuttle *already* has this infrastructure, and it's paid
for whether Shuttle continues to use it or not. The only costs you
can save are salary costs at the Cape, Houston, Stennis, etc. Now
those salaries represent the real core of NASA. So if your objective
is to destroy NASA, saving that money for HUD or the VA is the way
to do it.

>    The DC  will not need much more infrastructure, then a
>    airline hangar.  Henry, alan and I all believe that eliminating
>    all this structure and cost  will make up for any lower
>    vehicle lift capacity.

And it likely will in competition with MLVs if it works, but not with
HLVs or Shuttle for the missions they are best suited to do. Currently
there aren't that many missions needing heavy lift, seven people on orbit,
remote manipulation, long duration experiments, or payload return. Shuttle
does it with less than 8 launches a year. DC may put Atlas, Delta, Titan,
and Pegasus out of business, but it doesn't have the capacity to match
Shuttle or a true HLV for the times they're needed. DC may free Shuttle
for more such missions by relieving it of the need to fly less demanding
missions. That's good. Once we have Freedom in operation, even less need
will be found for Shuttle, and it can be phased out. But there will still
be missions where there's no viable substitute for heavy lift and only
the Russians still have an operational very heavy lift vehicle. It may
make sense just to contract with them, but I'd like to see the US
develop a new generation VHLV designed from the ground up to achieve
the lowest possible cost per pound. We've never tried to do that so
we don't know how cheaply it can be done.

>    Please demonstrate how Lockheed could eliminate all these costs
>    from commercial shuttle operations.

I don't think *Lockheed* could do it (reduce, not eliminate, these costs),
but Rockwell might, and Delta likely could. The government has civil
service, tons of rules, and mountains of paperwork that a commercial
firm would not have. Remember, most of Shuttle's costs are salary
costs for those folks filling out the forms, and the lawyers inventing
the forms, and the layers of managers overseeing it all. The guys and
gals actually touching the hardware are only a small fraction of that
army. Contrast UPS with the US Postal Service to get an idea of the
kinds of economies a private operation could offer.

Gary
--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV          |    You make it,     | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems |    we break it.     | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way             |    Guaranteed!      | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244     |                     | emory!ke4zv![e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 09:02:30 GMT
From: Nick Szabo <[e-mail]>
Subject: Marketing SSTO
Newsgroups: sci.space

A good point was made about accounting costs in the Shuttle
vs. SSTO cost thread: what we are trying to find from the
data determines what accountingg method we should use.
To replace the Shuttle the amortization+operation cost of the
new system should be less than STS's mean operational costs +
the amortization costs of any new orbiters, facilities, and
improvements beyond the current.  To get a historical
perspective on  what SSTO's costs might be, _if done like
STS_, we need to compute the total cost of STS, including
amortization of the c. $30 billion STS development costs.
When pondered in this light, SSTO doesn't look too good does
it!  Keep in mind that STS promised cost/lb. breakthroughs
every bit as dramatic as currently promised for SSTO; when
proposed STS was compelling for the same reason SSTO is
compelling today.

Cleary, we do not want to do SSTO like we did STS.  I suggest
SSTO strategy should be very different, almost the opposite
of the strategy used for STS.  STS combined astronaut and
satellite launching; there should be two very different SSTO
vehicles for these very different markets.  Shuttle
was designed and built by a commitee from NASA and the DoD
for the vague, sweeping purpose of lowering launch costs; SSTO
should be designed not to lower launch costs for everybody, but
to provide large service improvements to specific markets, for example
reducing the cost and increasing the reliability of delivering
satellites to orbit.  Shuttle was a single design centrally

planned; SSTO should come in several competing varieties.
STS was an entire "system" that needed new launch pads and was
part of a centrally planned strategy that included a a uniquely
sized, dependent set of payloads (Spacelab, Galileo, Magellan, Hubble,
etc.); SSTO should stand on its own as a launcher in the current
infrastructure, launching current payloads better.  For example,
a satellite-launching SSTO should be designed around current
comsat/upper stage pairs; an astronaut-launching SSTO might
be designed around Apollo, Soyuz, or the Shuttle cabin.

Alas, currently the program is headed in direction of the
swamp which bogged down the Shuttle, with strong lobbying
for NASA to take over the project as a new Clinton start-up.
This is great politically -- I came up with this idea well
before the election, when it first looked like the Democrats
had a fighting chance -- but it could be a disaster functionally,
as it puts SSTO down the same bureacrat-hobbled path that made
Shuttle amortization+operational costs over an order of magnitude
higher than promised, after inflation.  Furthermore, most
SSTO designs show astronauts going up and deploying satellites
like the Shuttle, with serious loss of mass for the payload on
the one hand, and limited complement or lab space for astronauts
on the other.  Automated satellite deployment has been used
since 1957, fer cryin' out loud!  Astronauts either have better
things to do, or nothing at all, in which case ferget 'em.

Which market should SSTO go for?  Clearly if there are several
SSTOs for several different purposes, there is no one answer.
So far, the replacement of STS has been a major goal.  However,
the astronaut market has a serious drawback.  It is a market
of civilian space agencies and ephemeral political winds.
These agencies up until now have insisted on having a central role
in designing and "man-rating" astronaut spacecraft.

Perhaps we can change this habit, both through politically efforts and
by the marketing of astronaut-SSTO to multiple space agencies.
For example, two competing astronaut SSTOs could provide commercial
astronaut services to a wide variety of government space agencies,
including many countries that currently have no access to spaceflight
other than via government agencies of Russia or the U.S.

The market for satellite launch, civilian and military, is much
larger and more reliable than the astronaut market, and probably
should be the focus of the first commercial SSTO.  If SSTO can deliver
cost reduction as promised, the subsisized and glutted launch markets
won't hurt it nearly as much as they have small rocket companies
promising small improvements.  Dramatic launch costs reductions,
even a factor of two to four, make economically viable large new
markets, including cellular phone and direct broadcast satellites,
economical private-sector earth imaging, etc.  An ELV launch operation
subsidized by 50% would soon be spilling red ink in the $billions,
while the SSTO folks rake in the profits!

Given the vast market potential of large cost/lb. reductions,
we should concentrate far more on making SSTO launch
cost reduction a technical reality, and far less on add-ons
such as satellite repair, astronaut capsules, etc.  The goal is to
_reduce_ costs, not to drive up costs by adding on side paraphanalia.
We want to bring big improvements to the current market, not pretend
like STS that we can design an all-encompassing, expensive "system"
that is supposed to change everything for everyone.  Once SSTO is
built and reduces costs for the large markets, then we can add on
the other nifty stuff as economics and politics permit.  I think
we will find that the best add-ons will be radically different
than the Shuttle-style paraphenalia we envision today.

SSTO's improvements for the current space market should stand on their own.
SSTO should not depend on any other new project for its rationale or
its success.


--
Nick Szabo                     [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 06:39:00 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: Moon Dust For Sale
Newsgroups: sci.space,sci.astro,alt.sci.planetary

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (fred j mccall 575-3539) writes:
>
>Of course, the preceding reasoning assumes that the sole function of
>the entire Moon program was to produce those rocks as a product.  I
>think there was just a BIT more to it than that.  Using the same
>logic, one could say that we paid $67 billion to develop Tang.

And worth every penny. Yum, yum. :-) :-)

Gary

--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV          |    You make it,     | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems |    we break it.     | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way             |    Guaranteed!      | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244     |                     | emory!ke4zv![e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 06:23:05 GMT
From: Gary Coffman <ke4zv!gary>
Subject: Space Questions and more..
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] writes:
>
>When DCX flys, why not use it as a way to lift a small payload such as the
>"solar Sail Race" contestants into space? That is if the contestants are
>unmanned..

Because DCX can't achieve orbit, it's not designed to do that. It's a
small test vehicle intended to prove out certain SSTO concepts in a
suborbital vehicle and isn't planned to be flown above 30,000 feet.

The entrants in the solar sail race will be unmanned. The flight time
to Lunar orbit will be weeks if not months. No planned sail can carry
enough life support for such a long flight.

Large solar sails may someday be useful for carrying non-perishable cargo
about the solar system, and the race is a way of proving out the concept.
It should really be viewed as a race between snails, however.

Gary

--
Gary Coffman KE4ZV          |    You make it,     | gatech!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary
Destructive Testing Systems |    we break it.     | uunet!rsiatl!ke4zv!gary
534 Shannon Way             |    Guaranteed!      | emory!kd4nc!ke4zv!gary
Lawrenceville, GA 30244     |                     | emory!ke4zv![e-mail]

------------------------------

End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 015
------------------------------